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The feeling of owning and controlling the body relies on the integration and interpretation
of sensory input from multiple sources with respect to existing representations of the
bodily self. Illusion paradigms involving multisensory manipulations have demonstrated
that while the senses of ownership and agency are strongly related, these two
components of bodily experience may be dissociable and differentially affected by
alterations to sensory input. Importantly, however, much of the current literature has
focused on the application of sensory manipulations to external objects or virtual
representations of the self that are visually incongruent with the viewer’s own body
and which are not part of the existing body representation. The current experiment
used MIRAGE-mediated reality to investigate how manipulating the visual, spatial and
temporal properties of the participant’s own hand (as opposed to a fake/virtual limb)
affected embodiment and action. Participants viewed two representations of their right
hand inside a MIRAGE multisensory illusions box with opposing visual (normal or grossly
distorted), temporal (synchronous or asynchronous) and spatial (precise real location or
false location) manipulations applied to each hand. Subjective experiences of ownership
and agency towards each hand were measured alongside an objective measure of
perceived hand location using a pointing task. The subjective sense of agency was
always anchored to the synchronous hand, regardless of physical appearance and
location. Subjective ownership also moved with the synchronous hand, except when
both the location and appearance of the synchronous limb were incongruent with
that of the real limb. Objective pointing measures displayed a similar pattern, however
movement synchrony was not sufficient to drive a complete shift in perceived hand
location, indicating a greater reliance on the spatial location of the real hand. The results
suggest that while the congruence of self-generated movement is a sufficient driver for
the sense of agency, the sense of ownership is additionally sensitive to cues about the
visual appearance and spatial location of one’s own body.
Keywords: body ownership, sense of agency, MIRAGE, multisensory integration, body representation, visual
distortion
INTRODUCTION
Experiencing a body as one’s own is dependent upon the integration and interpretation of
information from various sensory sources. Incoming information from the visual, tactile,
vestibular, auditory and proprioceptive systems is integrated to form ‘‘bottom-up’’ contributions
to body representation. These must also be interpreted with respect to ‘‘top-down’’ knowledge
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about the body, which modulates perceptual experience
(Tsakiris, 2017). Under normal circumstances, the sense of body
ownership seems effortless; that is, we do not have to decide
whether or not our body belongs to us. However, experimental
paradigms that involve the manipulation of multisensory inputs
allow investigation into how this sense of body ownership is
formed. In particular, introducing conflict between sensory
inputs and top-down knowledge can reveal to what extent each
contributes to the sense of owning and controlling the body.
The rubber hand illusion (RHI), first reported by Botvinick
and Cohen (1998), has provided much insight into how
multisensory interactions contribute to the experience of body
ownership. In the basic paradigm, participants watch a rubber
hand being stroked at the same time as their unseen real
hand is stroked. When the site of stimulation between the
two hands is visually congruent and the hands are stroked
in synchrony, participants typically report the feeling that
the rubber hand starts to become part of their body, and
when asked to indicate the location of their real hand,
estimates are displaced towards the rubber hand. However
when the timing or site of stroking between the real limb
and fake hand is asynchronous or incongruent, the illusion is
diminished. This finding is replicated throughout the literature
(Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini
and Haggard, 2007; Shimada et al., 2009) and highlights the
importance of intermodal correlations for the experience of
body ownership; in this case, the correlation between visual
and tactile inputs leads to the experience of ownership over
the rubber hand and a modulation of proprioception (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998). Armel and Ramachandran (2003) extend
this finding, reporting that synchronous visual and tactile
inputs were sufficient to induce a referral of tactile sensations
on to a wooden table and furthermore, led to physiological
responses consistent with embodiment of the table. The authors
suggested that perception is driven by Bayesian inference,
implying that so long as stimulation is synchronous, any
object may be experienced as belonging to oneself. However,
subsequent research has failed to support this assumption,
and instead demonstrates that while so-called ‘‘bottom-up’’
sensory correlations are necessary for the illusion, they are
not sufficient; ‘‘top-down’’ knowledge constrains the feeling
of ownership under certain conditions (Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005). The strength of the illusion is significantly reduced
when the rubber hand is replaced with a wooden hand or a
block (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010a) and
when the rubber hand is rotated to an implausible/incongruent
posture (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Holle et al., 2011; Ferri et al.,
2013). Interestingly, the physical characteristics of the fake
hand and their similarity to the participant’s real hand appear
to be less crucial; illusion experience is comparable for fake
hands of different skin colors (Farmer et al., 2012) and the
illusion is maintained for enlarged fake hands (although less
so for visually reduced hands; Pavani and Zampini, 2007).
Overall, the literature on body-ownership illusions demonstrates
that both bottom-up and top-down factors are important in
shaping bodily experience. Whilst spatiotemporal correlations
between seen and felt stimulation/movements are crucial for
the induction of ownership illusions, they are not sufficient;
the to-be-integrated stimulus must also be compatible with
semantic information about the body (Kilteni et al., 2015).
However, the latter component appears somewhat flexible, and
under normal conditions, visuo-tactile correlations are able to
override some aspects of cognitive knowledge (Farmer et al.,
2012; Newport et al., 2015). It is likely that the modification of
top-town constraints and the experience of sensory input are
bidirectional in nature as the brain attempts to minimize error
between predictions and incoming sensory data (see Tsakiris,
2017).
Although the RHI can inform our understanding of
some aspects of sensory integration and interaction between
bottom-up and top-down components, the traditional paradigm
is somewhat restricted, thus limiting what we can infer about
how sensory and cognitive factors affect perception of the body.
First, the illusion requires the participant to embody a static
object, over which they have no motor control. This limits
the intermodal correlations that can be investigated; typically
only visuo-tactile correspondences are considered as long as the
proprioceptive discrepancy is within acceptable limits. Recently,
modified versions of the RHI paradigm have emerged that
allow a basic motor correspondence between the movements
of the participant’s hand and the fake hand (Dummer et al.,
2009; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014), but this does not
extend to full control over the fake limb. Furthermore, this
paradigm required the real and fake hand/fingers to be physically
linked, which may affect top-down expectations during the
illusion.
Second, the focus of the paradigm is on the application of
manipulations to a fake limb, but it is theoretically important
to consider how feelings of ownership are affected when
these manipulations are applied to the real hand. In the RHI,
exploration of the interactions between visual, temporal and
spatial properties of the hand is constrained by the possible
manipulations that can be applied, and by the requirement
that the real hand be hidden from view (vision of the
real hand diminishes the illusion; Armel and Ramachandran,
2003). For example, the real hand (based on appearance) can
never be moved to an incorrect spatial location, nor can the
synchrony between the seen and felt touch on the real hand be
manipulated.
Some of these limitations are addressed in the use of
virtual reality paradigms, in which participants view a virtual
representation of their limb(s) through a head mounted display
(Slater et al., 2008). In the virtual hand illusion, the size and
position of the virtual hand is programmed such that it appears
as though the participant is looking directly at their own
hand, and the use of motion tracking technology allows the
virtual limb to mimic the participant’s movements. This has
enabled more precise investigation into the factors affecting body
ownership, with studies investigating the influence of visuomotor
correlations, and violations to semantic information including
size distortions and body discontinuity (Slater et al., 2009;
Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Kilteni et al., 2012; Tieri et al., 2015).
However, while virtual environments are realistic, the visual
characteristics of the limb make it apparent that one is viewing
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a virtual representation as opposed to one’s own hand. This
produces conflict between the existing visual body representation
and the seen limb, which may influence interactions between
top-down and bottom-up information (Azañón et al., 2016).
Since the perceptual aberrations experienced in disorders
affecting body representation are misperceptions arising from
the real body, it is important to determine whether the
principles of body ownership are similar under conditions
in which manipulations are applied to the participant’s own
hand, i.e., the seen hand matches the existing visual body
representation.
Although manipulating the physical properties of the real
hand when viewed directly is not possible, manipulations can be
applied using video technology. Gentile et al. (2013) manipulated
the synchrony and location of seen and felt tactile stimulation
using video recordings of the participants’ real hands taken
prior to the experiment. Participants viewed the video image
through a head-mounted display, creating the impression that
they were looking directly at their own hand. However, a
drawback of this method is that discrepancies may occur between
the pre-recorded video image and the participant’s real hand.
The use of pre-recorded videos also limits flexibility in the
application of experimental manipulations. These restrictions
can be overcome by using a live video image of the participant’s
hand. In the video-version of the RHI (the ‘‘projected hand
illusion (PHI)’’; Graham et al., 2015), the rubber hand is replaced
by a live video image of the participant’s own hand. As well as
allowing precise manipulation of the synchrony of seen and felt
brush strokes, the PHI allows the congruency between seen and
felt movements to be manipulated. This has been particularly
useful for investigating contributions to the sense of agency,
including distinctions between active vs. passive movement
generation (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Longo and Haggard, 2009;
Shimada et al., 2010).
In the PHI, an unmanipulated video image of the participant’s
hand is typically either projected onto the surface of a table
(e.g., Tsakiris et al., 2006) or shown via a display screen
embedded within a table (e.g., Graham et al., 2015). A
disadvantage of this set-up is that the viewed hand is in a
different plane to the real hand, which may require additional
computation factors for the brain to overcome. In addition, by
displaying an unmanipulated hand, the top-down factors that
can be investigated are restricted. This can be remedied by using
more immersive set-ups, such as virtual or mediated reality. The
MIRAGE device is an example of such a system, presenting
participants with a real-time video image of their own hand
that appears in the same spatial location as the participant’s real
hand, creating the impression that the participant is viewing
their hand directly. This enables visual, spatial and temporal
manipulations to be applied concurrently to the participant’s
own hand, revealing how such manipulations affect bodily
experience.
Previously, Newport et al. (2010) used the MIRAGE to
investigate how manipulating the congruency of seen and felt
tactile stimulation affected embodiment when participants were
presented with two competing representations of the hand.
Healthy participants viewed two images of their left hand, and the
synchrony of visual information was varied whilst participants
engaged in active touch. When one hand was synchronous
and the other was not, ownership and reaching movements
were consistent with embodiment of the synchronous hand.
This finding is consistent with previous literature demonstrating
the importance of intermodal correlations in determining
ownership. In this study, both hand images were offset at an equal
distance away from the participant’s real hand, meaning that
spatial (proprioceptive) information was not used to determine
ownership. The effect of spatial location was explored in a
later study by Newport and Preston (2011), who found that
participants disowned the hand in the correct spatial location
when feedback was asynchronous, instead taking ownership over
the spatially displaced synchronous hand. The manipulation
also reduced the accuracy of pointing responses, although
reaches were not consistent with complete embodiment of the
synchronous hand. Taken together, the findings of these studies
demonstrate a strong link between agency and ownership, with
ownership of the hand switching with motor synchrony. In
both those experiments, however, the appearance of the hand
was not manipulated and the two hand images were identical,
meaning that only bottom-up contributions to bodily experience
were explored. Here, we aim to extend the supernumerary limb
paradigm by additionally manipulating the visual appearance of
one of the images in order to investigate top-down influences on
embodiment. Specifically, we wanted to explore how changing
semantic information affects embodiment when manipulations
are applied to a realistic representation of the participant’s own
limb, rather than a fake hand or virtual limb (Kilteni et al.,
2015). By manipulating the congruency of visual, temporal and
spatial information of two virtual hands at the same time, the
aim is to directly compare the extent to which these factors
contribute to body perception and the sense of self. Showing two
hands simultaneously, with one always appearing in the same
location as the participant’s actual hand, allowed us to explore to
what extent certain characteristics ‘‘override’’ others with respect
to the sense of embodiment. The question being addressed is
whether temporal motor synchrony (and the associated sense of
agency) is powerful enough to override top-down visual factors
related to ownership of the hand, and whether the addition
of congruent proprioceptive information will modulate this.
Whereas the previous studies focused on the sense of ownership,
the present study aimed to capture a more detailed subjective
experience of embodiment by also measuring agency and sense
of location (Longo et al., 2008). Along with the inclusion of
manual pointing responses, which provided an implicit measure
of the ‘‘location’’ component of embodiment, this enabled amore
detailed investigation into how sensory manipulations affect
different components of embodiment.
Temporal synchrony of movement was predicted to be
the strongest driver of embodiment. It was hypothesized
that participants would report stronger embodiment over the
synchronous hand compared to the asynchronous hand, even
when spatial location of the synchronous hand was incongruent,
in line with previous findings (Newport et al., 2010; Newport and
Preston, 2011). In addition, it was predicted that the experience
of embodiment would be modulated by the appearance of the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 227
Ratcliffe and Newport Own-Body Ownership and Agency
hand, reflecting the influence of top-down knowledge about the
body. However, the extent of this modulation was expected to
depend on the spatial and temporal properties of the hands,
i.e., smaller effect when temporal and spatial information was
congruent. Furthermore, visual manipulations were predicted
to have a stronger influence on subjective reports compared to
pointing responses.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-nine participants (24 female) were recruited using online
advertisements and posters. The majority were students at
the University of Nottingham. The mean age of participants
was 22.12 years (SD = 4.05) and 35 self-reported being right
handed. This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the School of Psychology ethics committee
with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the School of Psychology
ethics committee.
Apparatus and Procedure
The experiment was carried out using MIRAGEmediated-reality
that duplicated a live (delay∼10 ms) digital representation of the
participant’s own right hand and presented both of these hands
in the same spatial plane as the real hand. Both hands appeared
to the right of the body midline and direct view of the upper limb
was obscured using a black bib.
Before the experiment began, the participant was given a
short time to view his or her unmanipulated and unduplicated
right hand in MIRAGE. During this time participants responded
to a six-item baseline questionnaire (see Table 1) to verify
embodiment of their hand under normal conditions. Responses
were on a 7-point scale running from −3 (strongly disagree) to
+3 (strongly agree). As expected, all participants immediately
reported strong embodiment of the hand in this unmanipulated
viewing condition. Following this, participants were given a
demonstration of the pointing task (see below), which was
demonstrated using two identical images of the participant’s
right hand, with no visual distortion applied.
At the start of each condition, the MIRAGE-mediated view
was blank and the participant placed his or her (unseen) hand
insideMIRAGE. The experimentermoved the hand to a specified
start location that varied between conditions. A regular short
tone, repeated at a rate of ∼1 Hz, was played via a computer as
a metronome beat and the participant tapped the index finger
of the right hand in time to the beat. When tapping in time,
the MIRAGE-mediated view presented the participant with two
images of his or her right hand. On each trial, the participant
saw two hands with opposing characteristics. One hand moved
in synchrony with the participant’s movements whilst the other
was asynchronous (factor: synchrony). The asynchrony was
produced by adding a fixed delay of 500 ms to the video image
via software control. At the same time, on the same trial, one
hand appeared normal whilst the other was distorted (factor:
appearance) and one hand was presented in the same location
as the participant’s real hand while the other was presented
in a false spatial location, displaced by 12 cm (factor: hand;
see Figure 1). After 30 s, the participant stopped tapping the
finger and completed either the questionnaire or the pointing
task (see below; order randomized across conditions). Following
completion, the experimenter picked up the participant’s hand
and moved it around before placing it on a start location. To
ensure that stimulation was equivalent before each task, the trial
was then repeated, with the participant completing the other task
after 30 s of tapping.
The distortion was created by defining a region of interest
around the handwithin the original captured image that was then
extracted and transformed to fill a space defined by four new
co-ordinates within the workspace. Bicubic filters ensured the
smooth transformation of the selected image region in a process
that took less than 2 ms with a modal transformation time of
1 ms. The appearance of the distorted hand was selected based on
the results of a pilot study in which participants (N = 51) rated the
appearance of several different hand images. The hand distortion
used in the current study was rated as significantly less realistic,
less ‘‘hand-like’’ and more distorted than an unmanipulated
hand.
To control for the physical location of the real hand
(left or right), each condition was presented twice with the
physical location of the hand varied such that the false
hand appeared either to the left or right of the real hand,
TABLE 1 | Items 1–6 assessed feelings of ownership, agency and sense of location towards each hand (hand on the left vs. hand on the right) resulting in
12 experimental questions.
It seemed like. . . Category
1 . . . the hand on the left/right belonged to me Ownership
2 . . . the hand on the left/right was part of my body Ownership
3 . . . I caused the movement of the left/right hand Agency
4 . . . I was in control of the left/right hand Agency
5 . . . my hand was in the location where the left/right hand was Location
6 . . . when I was tapping, my hand was moving in the location where I saw the left/right hand moving Location
7 . . . I had three right hands Control
8 . . . I no longer had a right hand Control
Two control items (items 7 and 8) were included to check for response bias. Items 1–5 were included in the baseline questionnaire, reworded to refer to the “hand image”.
Since there was no tapping in the baseline condition, item 6 was substituted for the following question in the baseline questionnaire: “it seems like the hand in the image
is my hand”.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2017 | Volume 11 | Article 227
Ratcliffe and Newport Own-Body Ownership and Agency
FIGURE 1 | TOP: example of the appearance and location of the hands
in two conditions: (A) Veridical hand normal; (B) Veridical hand distorted.
The physical location (real hand on left/right) and synchrony of finger
movements (real hand synchronous/asynchronous) was balanced, resulting in
a total of eight conditions. In the actual experiment, a black bib occluded
vision of the arm. BOTTOM: the yellow lines show example reach trajectories
in the pointing task. (C) illustrates a reach of the correct distance consistent
with perceiving the hand to be in the location of the veridical hand, whilst
(D) illustrates a reach of the correct distance consistent with perceiving the
hand to be in the location of the displaced hand. Note that during the actual
task, only the green cross was visible to participants—the hand images were
hidden.
but not overlapping, with both hands falling within the
right hemispace (see Figure 1). This resulted in a total of
eight different conditions, with participants completing the
questionnaire and pointing task once for each condition (order
randomized). Conditions were completed in a pseudorandom
order and counterbalanced between participants. There was a
short break between conditions, during which the participant
was encouraged to take his or her hand out of MIRAGE
and move it around to prevent any stiffness and carry-over
effects.
Questionnaire
At the end of the tapping period, the MIRAGE-mediated
view of the hands remained visible. Participants responded
to 12 statements designed to assess embodiment of the two
hands. The construct of embodiment was based on three distinct
components identified by Longo et al. (2008): ownership, agency
and location. The itemswere adapted from those used in previous
research (Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010b) and contained
six items relating to embodiment, each asked in reference to the
seen left and right hands separately. Two control questions were
included to check for response bias, giving a total of 14-items (see
Table 1). Participants gave verbal responses to each item using a
7-point scale ranging from−3 (strongly disagree) to + 3 (strongly
agree) and the experimenter recorded the response.
Pointing Task
At the end of the tapping period, the MIRAGE-mediated view
of the hands was replaced with a blank workspace except for a
green cross located equidistant between the index fingers of the
two (now unseen) hands. The participant’s task was to reach, in
one smooth movement, and point to the green cross using the
index finger such that the finger (if visible) would land at the
center of the cross. Reaching movements were recorded via the
MIRAGE device.
Analysis
Participants gave separate questionnaire responses for each hand.
A mean score for each component of embodiment (ownership,
agency and location), and the control questions, was calculated
by averaging each participant’s responses across the relevant
items (note that collating scores from individual items in
this way produces interval data; see Carifio and Perla, 2008).
Positive scores for ownership/agency indicate that the participant
experienced a sense of ownership/agency over the specified hand.
Positive scores for location indicate that the participant felt as
though their hand was in the location of the specified seen
hand. Preliminary analysis showed no effect of physical location.
Therefore the eight conditions were averaged across physical
location (left/right), resulting in four conditions that describe
the synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and appearance
(normal vs. distorted) of each hand (the veridical hand, i.e., the
hand in the same spatial location as the participant’s actual
hand, and the displaced hand, i.e., the hand in a different
spatial location to the participant’s actual hand). For brevity,
the conditions are referred to by reference to the synchrony
and appearance of one hand, (e.g., veridical hand synchronous
and normal), but note that the characteristics of the other
hand are simply the opposite (in this case, the displaced
hand is asynchronous and distorted). The data were analyzed
using 3-way repeated measures analysis of variances (ANOVAs)
with the factors HAND (Veridical; Displaced), SYNCHRONY
(Synchronous; Asynchronous) and APPEARANCE (Normal,
Distorted). A potential consequence of analyzing questionnaire
data this way is that the assumption of normality of residuals
is violated. Exploration of the data from each of the measures
showed that the distribution of residuals significantly differed
from normal in several conditions (ownership: 4/8; agency:
4/8; location: 3/8; pointing: 1/4). One option was to transform
the data, although this would have made the data difficult to
interpret. Given the factorial design of the study, non-parametric
analysis was considered unsuitable due to the inability of such
procedures to investigate interactions between factors. The 3-way
design would also have required a large number of post hoc
comparisons, which after correction for multiple comparisons
would dramatically reduce the likelihood of detecting true
significant effects (increased type II error). Furthermore, a
number of stimulation studies have concluded that ANOVA
is ‘‘robust’’ to deviations from normality, particularly when
sample size and variance is equal across groups (Glass et al.,
1972; Harwell, 1992; Norman, 2010; Schmider et al., 2010).
Therefore, the decision was made to proceed with the ANOVA
analysis, taking care to interpret statistical findings with respect
to measures of central tendency, the spread of the data and effect
sizes. In addition to themeans displayed in figures, median scores
are presented in Table 2 for comparison.
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TABLE 2 | Median and interquartile range for ownership, agency and location scores for each hand in each condition.
Hand Synchrony Appearance Ownership Agency Location
Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR
Veridical Sync Normal 2.75 1.00 2.75 0.50 2.50 0.75
Distorted 1.50 2.00 2.50 1.00 2.00 1.00
Async Normal 0.50 2.00 0.50 2.25 0.50 2.25
Distorted −1.50 1.75 −0.50 3.00 0.00 2.25
Displaced Sync Normal −2.00 1.50 −0.50 2.25 −2.00 1.25
Distorted −0.75 2.25 −0.25 2.50 −1.75 1.25
Async Normal 0.50 2.75 2.00 0.75 0.00 2.00
Distorted 2.00 1.75 2.50 1.00 0.75 2.75
Additionally, to ascertain whether or not participants
reported positive experience of each component, one-sample
t-tests were conducted to test whether means in each condition
were significantly greater than zero (Bonferroni method used to
control family-wise error rate). This procedure was to ensure that
positive ratings for each component represented a meaningful
rating of ownership/agency/location.
Reaches made during the pointing task were recorded via
video and data was extracted offline using a LabVIEW script
that identified the x-coordinates of the finger start location,
finger endpoint and the target, in pixels. The difference between
the finger start point and finger endpoint was calculated with
respect to the target location and converted into centimeters
(1 cm = 13 pixels), resulting in either a positive or negative
value that indicated both the distance and direction of the reach.
The distance between the veridical finger and the target was
6 cm. Therefore, a reach of 6 cm indicates a reach of the correct
distance consistent with reaching ‘‘with’’ (i.e., from the location
of) the veridical hand. Alternatively, a value of −6 cm indicates
a reach of the correct distance consistent with reaching ‘‘with’’
(from the location of) the displaced hand (see Figure 1). As with
the questionnaire measure, the eight conditions were averaged
across left/right location, resulting in four conditions. Again,
these are referred to in terms of the characteristics of the real
hand in each condition (false hand the opposite). The data
were analyzed using a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors SYNCHRONY (Synchronous; Asynchronous) and
APPEARANCE (Normal, Distorted).
RESULTS
Ownership
Figure 2 shows the mean ownership score for each condition.
The analysis revealed a significant effect of hand, F(1,38) = 23.47,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.382, as well as significant two-way
interactions for hand by synchrony, F(1,38) = 100.70, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.72, and hand by appearance, F(1,38) = 47.01, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.553. Simple main effects analysis comparing hand
at each level of synchrony showed that when the veridical
hand was synchronous, ownership scores were higher for the
veridical hand compared to the displaced hand, F(1,38) = 149.70,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.798 (M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: 1.78
[0.16] vs. −1.17 [0.16]). This pattern was reversed when the
veridical hand was asynchronous, F(1,38) = 19.29, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.337 (M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: −0.45 [0.16] vs. 0.87
[0.19]).
Simple main effects analysis comparing hand at each level of
appearance showed that when the veridical hand was normal
in appearance, ownership scores were higher for the veridical
hand compared to the displaced hand, F(1,38) = 79.54, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.677 (M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: 1.35 [0.11] vs. −0.71
[0.18]). However, there was no difference in ownership scores
when the veridical hand was distorted, F(1,38) = 2.48, p = 0.124,
η2p = 0.061 (M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: −0.01 [0.17] vs. 0.41
[0.16]).
In addition, one-sample t-tests were conducted to determine
in which conditions ownership scores were significantly greater
than zero, indicating a positive experience of ownership. Scores
for the veridical hand were significantly bigger than zero in
both conditions for which the veridical hand was synchronous
(normal: t(38) = 20.30, p < 0.001; distorted: t(38) = 5.22,
p < 0.001). Scores for the displaced hand were only significantly
bigger than zero when the veridical hand was asynchronous and
distorted (t(38) = 7.54, p< 0.001).
In summary, ownership was expressed for the veridical hand
when it was synchronous and either of normal or distorted
FIGURE 2 | Mean ownership score in each condition. ∗ Indicates mean is
significantly greater than zero after correcting for multiple comparisons. Error
bars: 95% CI.
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appearance, and for the displaced hand when it was synchronous
and normal in appearance.
Agency
Figure 3 shows agency scores for each condition. The analysis
revealed a significant effect of hand, F(1,38) = 13.96, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.269, along with a significant hand by synchrony
interaction, F(1,38) = 115.85, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.753, and a
hand by appearance interaction, F(1,38) = 20.22, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.347.
Simple main effects analysis comparing hand at each level
of synchrony showed that when the veridical hand was
synchronous, agency scores were higher for the veridical hand,
F(1,38) = 126.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.769 (M [SE] veridical vs.
displaced: 2.47 [0.09] vs. −0.48 [0.24]). The reverse pattern
was observed when the veridical hand was asynchronous,
F(1,38) = 78.50, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.674 (M [SE] veridical vs.
displaced:−0.19 [0.21] vs. 2.07 [0.12]).
Simple main effects analysis comparing hand at each level of
appearance showed that when the veridical hand was normal,
agency scores were higher for the veridical hand compared
to the displaced hand, F(1,38) = 35.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48
(M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: 1.36 [0.11] vs. −0.60 [0.15]).
However, there was no difference in agency scores when
the veridical hand was distorted, F(1,38) = 0.26, p = 0.615,
η2p = 0.007 (M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: 0.92 [0.13] vs. 0.99
[0.14]).
One-sampled t-tests revealed that agency scores for the
veridical hand were significantly bigger than zero in both
conditions for which the veridical hand was synchronous
(normal: t(38) = 32.22, p < 0.001; distorted: t(38) = 20.87,
p < 0.001). Furthermore, agency scores for the displaced hand
were significantly bigger than zero in both conditions for which
the veridical hand was asynchronous i.e., the displaced hand
was synchronous (normal: t(38) = 14.71, p < 0.001; distorted:
t(38) = 14.99, p< 0.001).
FIGURE 3 | Mean agency score in each condition. ∗ Indicates mean is
significantly greater than zero after correcting for multiple comparisons. Error
bars: 95% CI.
In summary, agency was expressed for the hand that was in
temporal synchrony with the movements of the veridical hand,
regardless of location or appearance.
Location
Figure 4 shows location scores for each condition. Again, there
was a main effect of hand, F(1,38) = 60.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62,
and significant two-way interactions for hand by synchrony,
F(1,38) = 88.71, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.700, and hand by appearance,
F(1,38) = 19.65, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.341.
Simple main effects analysis comparing hand at each level
of synchrony showed that when the veridical hand was
synchronous, location scores were significantly higher for the
veridical hand, F(1,38) = 363.78, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.905 (M [SE]
veridical vs. displaced: 2.25 [0.09] vs. −1.73 [0.15]). However,
there was no difference in location scores when the veridical hand
was asynchronous, F(1,38) = 0.100, p = 0.754, η2p = 0.003 (M [SE]
veridical vs. displaced: 0.23 [0.20] vs. 0.37 [0.23]).
Simple main effects analysis comparing hand at each level of
appearance showed that when the veridical hand was normal,
location scores were higher for the veridical hand compared
to the displaced hand, F(1,38) = 90.67, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.705
(M [SE] veridical vs. displaced: 1.52 [0.12] vs. −0.87 [0.16]).
The reverse pattern was observed when the veridical hand was
distorted, F(1,38) = 26.46, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.411 (M [SE] veridical
vs. displaced: 0.97 [0.14] vs.−0.49 [0.17]).
One-sampled t-tests revealed that location scores for the
veridical hand were significantly bigger than zero in both
conditions for which the veridical hand was synchronous
(normal: t(38) = 29.92, p < 0.001; distorted: t(38) = 15.27,
p < 0.001). When the veridical hand was asynchronous,
location scores were not significantly greater than zero for
either the normal or distorted hand after correcting for multiple
comparisons.
In summary, participants felt as though their hand was in
the same location as the veridical hand regardless of whether
FIGURE 4 | Mean location score in each condition. ∗ Indicates mean is
significantly greater than zero after correcting for multiple comparisons. Error
bars: 95% CI.
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it appeared normal or distorted, but only when the veridical
hand was synchronous; when it was asynchronous (and thus the
displaced hand was synchronous), the perceived location of the
hand was ambiguous.
Pointing Task
Mean distance reached (cm) is displayed in Figure 5, with lower
values reflecting reduced accuracy. The analysis revealed a main
effect of synchrony, F(1,37) = 75.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.672, and a
main effect of appearance, F(1,37) = 49.95, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.574, as
well as a significant interaction between the two, F(1,37) = 11.55,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.238.
Simple main effects analysis of appearance at each level of
synchrony revealed a significant effect of appearance both when
the veridical hand was synchronous, F(1,37) = 6.44, p = 0.016,
η2p = 0.148, and when it was asynchronous, F(1,37) = 31.78,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.462. When the veridical hand was synchronous,
accuracy was lower when the hand was distorted compared to
when it was normal (mean difference: 0.47 cm), although it
should be noted that overall accuracy remained high. The same
pattern was observed when the veridical hand was asynchronous,
with lower accuracy for when the veridical hand was distorted
compared to when it appeared normal, although the difference
between the means was much larger compared to when the
veridical hand was synchronous (mean difference: 1.95 cm), and
overall accuracy was lower.
In summary, when the synchronous hand was
proprioceptively congruent with the real hand, participants
pointed with the synchronous hand (that is, from the location
of the synchronous hand) regardless of physical appearance.
FIGURE 5 | Mean distance reached (cm) in the pointing task
(in horizontal plane). The dotted line at 6 cm represents a reach of the
correct distance consistent with reaching “with” (i.e., from the location of) the
veridical hand. Alternatively, the dotted line at −6 cm indicates a reach of the
correct distance consistent with reaching “with” (from the location of) the
displaced hand. A reach of 0 cm indicates that the participant reach
straight-ahead, consistent with the perception that their hand was located
directly between the two hand images they saw. Error bars: 95% CI.
When the synchronous hand was incongruent with the
location of the real hand, the inferred origin of reaches was
shifted towards the displaced, synchronous hand, but not
completely. This effect was modulated by appearance and was
greater when the displaced, synchronous hand was normal in
appearance.
Correlations between Components
In addition to the main analyses, exploratory correlational
analyses were conducted to assess the relationship between the
different components of embodiment in each condition. For the
subjective components, correlations were conducted on scores
for the veridical hand only.
Pearson correlations (shown in Table 3) revealed significant
positive correlations between the subjective components,
ownership, agency and location, in all conditions except when
the veridical hand was synchronous and distorted (displaced
hand asynchronous and normal). In that condition, location
scores were significantly correlated with both ownership and
agency, however ownership and agency were not significantly
correlated with each other.
Pointing accuracy was significantly correlated (positively)
with location scores for all conditions except when the veridical
hand was synchronous and distorted. Aside from a significant
correlation between pointing accuracy and ownership scores in
one condition, all other correlations were not significant (see
Table 3).
DISCUSSION
This study investigated how manipulating visual, temporal and
spatial information about the hand influenced body perception in
TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations between the four measures for each
condition.
Ownership Agency Location
Veridical hand synchronous and normal
Ownership −
Agency 0.404∗ −
Location 0.421∗∗ 0.504∗∗ −
Pointing −0.060 0.251 0.331∗
Veridical hand synchronous and distorted
Ownership −
Agency 0.178 −
Location 0.382∗ 0.792∗∗ −
Pointing 0.100 0.200 0.242
Veridical hand asynchronous and normal
Ownership −
Agency 0.452∗∗ −
Location 0.727∗∗ 0.490∗∗ −
Pointing 0.458∗∗ 0.045 0.577∗∗
Veridical hand asynchronous and distorted
Ownership −
Agency 0.494∗∗ −
Location 0.489∗∗ 0.545∗∗ −
Pointing −0.079 −0.116 0.326∗∗
Significant associations are indicated by asterisks, where ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
N = 39 for all.
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relation to agency and ownership. Participants tapped the index
finger up and down whilst viewing two representations of his or
her own hand that had opposing visual (normal or distorted),
temporal (synchronous or asynchronous movement) and spatial
(real location or false location) characteristics. Questionnaire
responses captured perceived ownership, agency and sense of
location for each hand, and pointing responses served as an
implicit measure of embodiment.
For agency, the strongest driver was temporal synchrony;
participants felt a sense of control over whichever hand moved
in synchrony with their own movements, and the sense of
agency remained regardless of visual appearance or location
relative to the real hand (see Figure 3). The effects were
somewhat different with regards to ownership; whilst temporal
synchrony remained an important factor, the sense of ownership
was additionally modulated by visual appearance and location:
while ownership was reported for the synchronous hand in
either location, the strength of feeling was lessened if that hand
was grossly distorted or if the location was incongruent with
the real hand (see Figure 2), to the extent that ownership
was not claimed if the hand was both distorted AND in an
incongruent location. Subjectively, the real hand was felt to be
in the same location as the synchronous hand only when the
synchronous hand was in the same location as the real hand
in reality (veridical hand synchronous conditions in Figure 4).
When the asynchronous hand was in the same location as the
real hand in reality (veridical hand asynchronous conditions
in Figure 4), subjective location became uncertain and was
reported to be in neither the location of the synchronous
nor asynchronous hand. Subjective reports were consistent
with objective pointing data: the inferred start locations were
consistent with reaching ‘‘with’’ (from the location of) the
synchronous hand when it was in the same physical location
as the real hand, but from between the two hands when
the hand seen in the same location as the real hand was
asynchronous (see Figure 5). That is, start locations were dragged
towards the synchronous hand, but not completely, suggesting
modulation by proprioception and congruence with the real
hand location.
The present work is the first study to investigate how
distorting the appearance of the participant’s own hand
affects embodiment when simultaneous spatial and/or
temporal manipulations are applied. Previous experiments
have demonstrated how manipulating the appearance,
temporal synchrony or the spatial location of fake or
virtual limbs influences feelings of embodiment. However,
it is unclear whether the same mechanisms apply when
manipulations are applied to (an image of) one’s own
hand. Experiencing an external object as part of your own
body is likely to involve different multisensory interactions
compared to when manipulations are applied to an image
of one’s own hand. In comparison to a fake hand, viewing
a representation of one’s own hand might be expected
to evoke stronger top-down influences, due to the fact
that the visual appearance of the hand is consistent with
the visual representation in the existing internal model
(Tsakiris, 2010). This may influence the integration of
top-down and bottom-up inputs, potentially causing visual
information regarding the appearance of the hand to be given
a stronger weighting compared to situations in which visual
information is obviously inaccurate or false. Such strong
visual information may even be sufficient to overcome other
sensory discrepancies, such as incongruence between seen
and felt movements (or touch), contradicting results from
fake/virtual body paradigms. Such a finding would also have
important implications for our understanding of disorders
of body representation, where perceptual aberrations arise
from one’s own body rather than misperceptions of external
objects.
Importantly, the findings show that even when participants
view normal and distorted representations of their own hand,
visuomotor synchrony is the strongest driver of both agency
and ownership: in all four conditions, participants reported a
strong sense of agency for whichever hand was synchronous, and
a sense of ownership was reported over the synchronous hand
in all but one condition. However, the results also show that
violations of top-down knowledge about the body, introduced
through the visual distortion, have different implications for
agency and ownership. While the contrasting visual appearance
between the two hands had little effect on agency, participants
reported significantly less ownership over the hand when it
was distorted, indicating that ownership is more influenced
by the visual information about the hand form/appearance
compared to agency. This is in line with findings showing
that postural manipulations of fake/virtual hands have a
greater effect on ownership compared to agency (Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012; Salomon et al., 2016). Here, we extend these
findings by showing a similar effect when manipulating the
visual characteristics of the participant’s own hand, indicating
that agency and ownership are at least partially independent
processes. Further evidence for this is found in the comparison
of ownership and agency ratings in the condition for which the
veridical hand was both asynchronous and of normal appearance
(displaced hand synchronous-distorted); participants reported
a strong sense of agency over the displaced hand but no
sense of ownership over either hand. This demonstrates first
that ownership is not necessary for agency, and second that
agency is not sufficient for ownership, supporting previous
suggestions that ownership and agency are dissociable (Tsakiris
et al., 2010b; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). However, the
present results cannot conclude that agency and ownership
are completely independent. It is notable that participants
did not report ownership for a hand that they did not
also have a sense of agency for although see Kalckert and
Ehrsson (2012), and furthermore under no circumstances did
participants claim ownership of one hand, but agency of
another.
The significant associations between the subjective
experiences of ownership, agency and location support
the notion that these three factors can be considered as
subcomponents of a broader bodily experience, termed
embodiment (Longo et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2015). In
particular, the strong association between ownership and
agency suggests that these two components share at least
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some common mechanisms. Although both ownership and
agency correlated with the subjective sense of location, neither
correlated with pointing accuracy, the implicit measure of
perceived hand location (with the exception of ownership in
one condition). However, pointing accuracy did correlate with
subjective location scores in all but one condition, supporting the
suggestion that the pointing task provides an implicit measure of
the location component of embodiment.
The current study extends previous findings from the
supernumerary limb paradigm, which found that ownership
of the hand moved with visuomotor synchrony (Newport
et al., 2010; Newport and Preston, 2011). However, in those
experiments, the two hands were identical in appearance. The
current experiment demonstrates that visuomotor synchrony
does not completely dictate ownership when competing
top-down (appearance) and bottom-up (proprioception) factors
provide additional, conflicting information. Similarly, ownership
is not driven by appearance alone; seeing a representation
of one’s own hand (normal appearance) is not sufficient to
override the influences of incongruent temporal and spatial
information. Rather unsurprisingly, perhaps, the brain seems to
weigh up the available sensory information andmake sense of the
body accordingly. When the hand is synchronous, in the same
location and with veridical appearance, it is owned; when it is
asynchronous, in the wrong location and looks wrong, it is not;
all other combinations are somewhere in between.
While the present study demonstrates that altering the
appearance of the hand reduces the sense of ownership,
participants still experienced ownership over the distorted
hand when it was temporally and spatially congruent with
their actual limb (see Figure 2, veridical hand synchronous
and distorted condition). The extent to which the appearance
of the hand can be altered whilst maintaining a sense of
ownership (when all other factors are constant) remains unclear.
In future work we aim to clarify this by manipulating the
visual similarity between the participant’s own hand and the
viewed limb in different stages, gradually increasing the level
of distortion/dissimilarity. This will shed further light on the
interplay between bottom-up and top-down factors during body
representation.
Overall, the findings reveal important information about
the way in which different sensory information is used to
form a representation of the body. Few studies have examined
how specific visual characteristics of the hand affect experience
of embodiment, despite vision providing a key source of
information used to distinguish between self and other. When
visual characteristics have been explored, these have been
limited to altering the appearance of a fake limb, rather than
changing the appearance of the participant’s own hand (e.g.,
Heed et al., 2011; Bertamini and O’Sullivan, 2014). In line with
previous research, the results showed that temporal synchrony
had the strongest effect on the sense of ownership, agency
and perceived location of the hand as measured by both the
questionnaire and pointing responses. Importantly, the visual
appearance of the hand also had a smaller but significant effect
on responses. The difference between normal and distorted
hands was minimal for both agency and location scores, but
the effect was larger for ownership scores, suggesting visual
information is weighted more strongly in determining the sense
of ownership. Visual information also had an effect on pointing
responses, but only in conditions for which the veridical hand
was asynchronous (displaced hand synchronous). The findings
also demonstrate that participants were sensitive to the spatial
location of the hands, although the extent to which this affected
responses differed across components. Both questionnaire scores
of perceived location and pointing responses were particularly
sensitive to hand location; specifically, synchronous movement
of the displaced hand was not sufficient to result in a shift in
perceived hand location towards that hand, even when it also
appeared normal.
Taken together, the findings support the distinction between
agency and ownership. While visuomotor synchrony is sufficient
for the sense of agency, the sense of ownership is reduced
when the visual appearance or physical location of the hand
is manipulated. Furthermore, the study highlights how distinct
sensory inputs are weighted differently, and combined with
top-down knowledge of the body, to contribute to individual
components of embodiment.
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